

Executive Registry

84-167

12 January 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Technology Transfer Briefing for NASA Officials

1. As a result of a special technology transfer briefing for NASA Administrator James Beggs late last year, Mr. Beggs requested that a similar briefing be given to his Deputy Administrator and others. The latter briefing was given on 4 January 1984 to the following individuals.

- . Hans Mark - Deputy Administrator
- . Philip E. Culbertson - Asst. Deputy Administrator
- . Norman Terrell - Associate Administrator for Policy
- . Dr. Milton Silveira - NASA Chief Engineer
- . Dr. William Raney - Asst. Associate Administrator for
Space Science and Application
- . John W. Boyd - Associate Administrator Management
- . James Morrison - Deputy Director International Affairs
- . Conrad Forsyth - Director DoD Affairs
- . Myron Krueger - Asst. Director DoD Affairs
- . James R. Shaw - Technical Coordinator DoD Affairs
- . William R. Purffer - Chief of Security
- . Douglas Norton - International Affairs-Export Controls

2. [REDACTED]

The discussions during the approximate 45 minute briefing and 30 minutes thereafter with the entire group were intellectually challenging and lively. I believe I made a strong case for technology losses across the board, not just NASA-related losses, and struck some sensitive nerves. The discussions included the following points, which also give an idea of how some NASA officials feel about the issue.

- . Norman Terrell (Policy) took umbrage with comparing the number (small) of NASA non-classified but controlled documents with those (large) of DoD and DoE. There was no dispute about the accuracy of our data. He argued that using a chart comparing publications of DoD and DoE, which produce weapons and military equipment, and NASA, which is an Agency involved in advancing the state-of-the-art and

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publishing open literature, was an attack on an open Agency and on NASA open publications.

- . I explained the purpose of the comparison was to show a possible technique to limit Soviet access to NASA advanced technology and concepts that are useful and used by Soviet military industries--a technique that is not a security classification--and yet would still permit very wide distribution to US defense and other appropriate NASA contractors who need the data for scientific exchange and innovation. Much discussion pursued. I believe that even "light" controls slow down Soviet acquisition efforts.
- . In additional discussions, Hans Mark repeatedly hammered away at the notion that all forms of controls--export, open literature, and others--are unproductive, not worth anything, and strictly "overhead" costs.
- . Such money and efforts, he felt, should be given to accelerate the US state-of-the-art, and thus keep the US-USSR technology gap wide this way. Although appreciative of our efforts to brief him, he characterized the concern for the overall problem/effort as a pile of "bull manure".
- . In response to my hypothetical question about selling supercomputers to the Soviets, like the ten that Livermore has, he said we should, and use the profits to build the next generation. Lively discussions about Soviet exploitation of supercomputers and other facets of his statements lost Dr. Mark the support of many of his colleagues in the room.
- . In a skeptical vien, both Hans Mark and Norman Terrell indicated a desire to see a sensitivity analysis done comparing the difference between cases where we had government constraints and were able to buy time and a technology gap (Δ) versus when we didn't have constraints and bought a different technology gap (Δ'). If the latter gap were much smaller than the former, then they both felt the overhead cost of controls might be worth it. I imagine case examples might include a Manhattan-like project versus the relatively open US Shuttle program. We plan to look into this sensitivity suggestion.
- . I enjoyed the give and take of this particular briefing, and I was treated professionally at all times.

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[Redacted]
Chief
Technology Transfer Assessment Center

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Memo is Secret [Redacted]
in its entirety

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OSWR/TTAC, [REDACTED] (10 Jan 84)

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